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A
DISSERTATION
ON

Matter *and* Spirit :

WITH

Some REMARKS on a Book,

Entitled,

An Enquiry into the Nature of the humane Soul.

By JOHN JACKSON,

RECTOR of *Rossington* in the County of
York, and Master of *Wigston's* Hospital in
Leicester.

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THE Subject of the following Dissertation being of no small Importance both in Philosophy and Religion, ought to be freely enquir'd into and seriously attended to. An impartial Enquiry into the Nature of our Souls and Bodies, or of Matter and Spirit, cannot but tend to give us just Notions of the Frame and Constitution of our Beings, to attain which is highly worthy the Study and Endeavours of every rational humane Person.

As we are compounded of two Parts or Beings, one of which is intelligent and active; and the other unintelligent and passive; the great Question hereupon hath been amongst inquisitive men, how far and in what respects these differ from each other: whether they differ Essentially, or in their Original internal Nature or Substance; or whether their Difference only consists in Mode of Existence and some Properties which are not Essential to them.

They who suppose every Being (as well as the humane Soul) to be Material, or Body, do in Consequence make Matter necessarily-existent, eternal, infinite, and also necessarily endued with Motion and Intelligence: which is prodigiously unphilosophical, and downright Atheism. The Mutability of Matter, which also by Philosophical Experiments is found to be finite and to fill but a very small Part of the immense Space, is directly repugnant to its suppos'd necessary Existence and Infinity: and as all Motion is inconsistent with absolute Infinity of Being, so necessarily-existent Motion (or even a Conatus to it) necessarily destroys itself; because, if necessary at all, it must be necessary every way equally always, which is contradictory and impossible; it must likewise be necessary in every Part of Matter and in every Degree of Motion, which is contrary to Fact; and wou'd thereby (if possible so to exist) be inconsistent not only with a state of Rest in any one Body or Piece of Matter, but also with the Composition and Formation of Bodies at all, and make the Universe a Mass only of disunited Atoms. Besides the Vis inertiae or natural Inactivity and Resistance of all Matter to Motion shews demonstratively that it is not essentially endued with Motion, or the Motion of it necessarily-existent. And farther both the different Degrees of Intelligence in Beings, and also the evident Absence of it in many Beings, in all mutable, compounded Matter, demonstratively shew again, that Matter, if at all, is not essentially

tially or necessarily intelligent: because, if it was, not only every Part of Matter or distinct Material Body wou'd be equally intelligent; but intelligent also in every possible or highest Degree of Intelligence. So that it follows from the Mutability, Finiteness and Inactivity of Matter, and the Variety of its Composition, Form and Motion, and the different Degrees of Intelligence with which Beings are endued, that Matter or Body is not and cannot be self-existent and universal Nature: but it hence demonstratively follows on the contrary, that there exists distinct from and independent of Matter and all intelligent finite Beings, a necessarily-existent, eternal, infinite and intelligent free Cause or Agent, who is the Author of Matter, and Motion, and of all those intelligent Beings; and who is Himself alone necessarily intelligent and all-perfect, and the Creator, Preserver and Governour of Universal Nature.

On the other hand, they who contend that there is a Difference of Nature and Essential Properties between Material and Spiritual Substance; and that Matter is incapable (even by the Power of God) of the Property of Intelligence, and Spirit of the Property of Solidity, seem to me, for Want of sufficient Evidence of the Truth of their Assertion [Solidity and Thinking not being incompatible, that we know of] to attribute too much to their own Understanding, and too little to the divine Power. Wou'd they be contented with a Probability of their Opinion, it might reasonably be admitted; but Demonstration

tion of it is more than they are able to make out.

Others go farther and alledge that it is derogatory to Religion to suppose the Substance of the humane Soul material; that the Consequence of it is to deny the Natural Immortality of it; and to make it mortal and corruptible like the compounded Bodily Part and common Matter: and so to take away the Natural Proof of a future State, and of Rewards and Punishments, in another Life after this.

But these can only be the Sentiments of weak Bigots, who neither understand Philosophy nor Religion; neither of which teaches that the humane Soul (whether material or not) is naturally immortal. And as Philosophy informs us, that Matter of itself no more tends to Annihilation than Spirit does; and that probably Solid uncompoundd Bodies, or the original constituent Parts of Material Beings are as immutable and incorruptible, as spiritual or intelligent Substance is or can be; so both Philosophy and Religion agree to assure us, that whether the Soul is in its own Nature mortal and corruptible, or immortal and incorruptible, the Power and Providence of God can and will make it to subsist in a future State, and render it capable of those Rewards and Punishments hereafter, which are the just natural Consequence or the reveal'd Recompence of Good and Evil done in this Life.

So that if the humane Soul cou'd be prov'd to be Material, that wou'd have no ill Influence on Religion, or in the least weaken the natural or

• reveal'd Evidence of a future State. But as on the one hand, some Atheistical Writers, the Cartesians and Spinozists, have given to Matter Powers and Properties that cannot possibly belong to it, and have even deify'd it; so others, thro' a Superstitious Blindness, and Ignorance in Philosophy, have run into the contrary Extreme, and have vilify'd it in an unreasonable manner: tho' they cannot but be sensible of the wonderful and beneficial Powers and Effects of it manifested in the Works of Creation and Providence; and that it is by God's Will and Appointment made the Instrument and Means of all our Knowledge and Happiness here, and, as is probable, also hereafter. ||

I thought it proper to premise briefly so much, in order to obviate and prevent any Prejudice or wrong Conceptions which otherwise might possess the Minds of some Readers of the following

|| I have taken no notice of a new Hypothesis in Philosophy, which hath been lately advanc'd, viz. that there is no such Thing really existing in Nature as Substance, either Material or Spiritual; and that what is so call'd is only an Aggregate of Properties without any existent Subject: so that Extension, Solidity, Intelligence, &c. exist without any Thing or Being extended, solid, intelligent, &c. In Consequence of this Philosophy it follows that there is Motion, but no Mover or Thing mov'd; Life, but no Thing living; Agency, but no Agent; Virtue, but no Virtuous Person; Sin, but no Sinner; divine Attributes and Perfection, but no perfect Being or God. This is a Scheme of Philosophy so wholly unsupported by any Reason or Evidence, and so contrary to the common Sense of Mankind, as well as to that of the greatest Philosophers, and is withal so visionary and unintelligible, that the ridiculous Absurdity of it (if no ill Consequences attended it) must render it incapable of a serious Confutation.


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*Dissertation on a curious and difficult Subject ;
and which is written with that impartial Free-
dom which ought especially to be allow'd and en-
courag'd in all Matters of Philosophy and Re-
ligion, which are the only Ornaments and Per-
fection of every rational Nature.*



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DISSERTATION

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Matter and Spirit.

IT is on all hands granted without controversy, that we know nothing of the *internal Nature, Essence or Substance* either of *Matter* or of *Spirit*; or what that internal *Constituent* or *Substratum* is, which is the *Ground, Foundation* or *Subject* of the *Properties* existing in them. The Reason of this our Ignorance is, that it is not the Object of any of our *Senses*; nor can be discover'd by any *reflex* Act of our Minds either upon *Matter* or upon themselves: and therefore the Reason we call the one *Matter*, and the other *not Matter* or *Spirit*, is not deduc'd from our Knowledge of their *internal Substances*, but of their *external* different *Properties* only, which we know cannot exist without a Subject. Hence it follows that we cannot certainly know [unless there was an apparent essential Contradiction between them] whether the *different Properties* we

observe in them, and which is all we know of their *Difference*, and from which we are apt to conclude their internal Essences and Substances to be *different* in Kind or Species, are really *essential* (and so incompatible) or not; or such as that the Existence of their internal Substance or Substratum depends upon them; or without which it cou'd not be what it is.

I presume we do not know, and therefore cannot say of a Certainty, but that the *Subject* or Foundation of the Properties either of Matter or Spirit may possibly exist abstract from or without the *different* Properties we ever yet observ'd in them, and by which we properly distinguish them: and therefore in consequence we cannot be certain but that the *Substance* of Matter and Spirit may be the *same*; and that they differ only by such different Properties or Modes of Existence or Powers of exciting Ideas in us [not such as are *Essential* to either, but such] as it is the *Will* of God for different Ends to invest them with.

From what is said it clearly follows, that we cannot know that *Matter* cannot *think*; or that *Spirit* may not be *meerly passive* and *solid*; that is, whether the *Substance* or *Substratum* of what we call *Matter* is not in any respect or under any possible Mode of Existence capable [by the Will and Power of God] of *Consciousness* and *Intelligence*; and the *Substance* of what we call *Spirit* is not in like manner capable of *Solidity* and *mere Passiveness*: and therefore that their Difference with respect to our Knowledge of them

them is not *essential* or *internal*, but only *nominal* and *external*. I mention *Solidity* and mere *Passiveness* in *Matter* in opposition to *active Intelligence*, and something suppos'd to belong to *Spirit*, for which I want a proper Name, in opposition to *Solidity* (I will for the present call it *Non-resistance*) because I am apt to think that when Things are rightly consider'd, these are the only Differences we with reason conceive to be between them ; and by which we most properly distinguish them.

Some indeed have thought *Extension*, *Figure* and *Mobility* peculiar to *Matter* ; but till some better Reasons be given for this Opinion than I have hitherto met with, I shall conclude that nothing can exist without *Extension*, or existing *in space* [and *Extension* certainly may be without *Solidity*, they being as different Ideas as any two whatever, nor any way inferring reciprocal Coexistence, and so *Extension* cannot be peculiar to *Matter*] for no Existence can be without a *Place* of Existence, or existing *somewhere* ; and no *Place* can be without *Extension* or *Space*, *Place* being evidently only a partial Idea of *Extension* or *Space* : and *Spirit* exists and acts *in Space*, as evidently as *Matter* exists and is acted upon by it *in Space* ; and therefore is and cannot but be extended as *Matter* is. The actual Existence of an *unextended* Point, or something really existing, and yet not existing *in Space*, is not only impossible and unconceivable ; but supposing *Spirit* or thinking Substance to be such, it cou'd not receive Objects at once from more

Points than *one*, or from any real Extension, and so cou'd not perceive any Thing *extended*: which is contrary to Experience.

Secondly ; whatever is *finitely* extended must have an external Termination of Existence, and so have *Figure* ; and for the same Reason it must be also capable of *Motion* ; as we every day see in Fact that *Spirit* is, (supposing our Souls to be such) being mov'd with the Body ; but if by *Mobility* be meant the motion of internal parts, then Spirit is not indeed capable of such a Motion (that we know of) nor *simple, solid* material Substances (which Only I consider in this Argument) neither.

This being laid down, there are several Arguments and Objections to be answer'd.

First ; 'tis said that *Matter* is *essentially separable* and *Spirit* *essentially inseparable* and *indivisible*: Secondly, that the Property of *Intelligence* or *Consciousness* is an *individual* Property of the *whole* thinking Substance, but that there is *no individual* Property of the *whole* Substance of Matter: and therefore, 'tis argued, their internal *Essences* and *Substances* cannot be the *same*. These two Arguments or Objections depend on each other ; for I suppose the best Reason any one can give why the Soul is *indivisible* (its not being extended being a mere Fiction and plain Absurdity) is because *Consciousness*, a Property of it, is not *divisible* in Idea into more or several *Consciousnesses*.

Granting this *Indivisibility* of Spirit or thinking Substance [which yet is more than we certainly know, tho' probable] it does by no means

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prove the internal Substance or abstract Substratum of *Matter* and *Spirit* to be different [the only true Question being, whether the Properties of the one are compatible to the other;] but only that *Spirit* is a *simple*, and *Matter* (so far as it comes under our Notion and Knowledge) a *compound* Being: that is, strictly speaking, *Matter* is not *one* Substance, but many *simple* Substances united together by mutual *Attraction* or *Gravitation* and *Cohesion*, [which Powers, whether they belong at all to intelligent Beings, we know not:] and it is for this reason only that *Matter* is truly said to be *divisible*, and thence infer'd to be incapable of an *individual* Property belonging to its *whole* Substance, as being compounded of *simple* parts *separable* and actually *separated* from each other; and so is not *one* Substance, but a Mass of Substances; the Original *simple* parts of which *compound* Substance, and which are in themselves distinct Substances, are as *indivisible* as the Substance of *Spirit*; and equally capable (for ought we know) of the *individual* Property of *Consciousness* or *Intelligence*. For individual *Consciousness*, &c. does not exclude or is inconsistent with the *Extension* of the *conscious* or *intelligent* Being; or is a *Consciousness* arising from something which is absolutely divested of all Physical Parts; nor as being an *unextended* Property infers the Substance or Substratum of it to be also *unextended*, any more than the *unextended* Properties of *Matter*, *Solidity*, *Inactivity*, *Mobility*, &c. infer *Matter* it self to be *unextended*; but it is the Property of

a Being whose parts are one *Continuum*, and so peculiarly *connected*, that the *whole* is at once *uniformly* affected; and so every *Action* or *Passion* is not of a *Part*, but of the *whole* Substance; and in this sense *individual*: tho' in strict metaphysical Reality the Affection of *one Part* cannot be the *individual* Affection of *another Part*; or the *Perceptivity* of one Part the *individual Perceptivity* of another Part; any more than the *Existence*, *Solidity* or *Mobility* of *one Part* of any continued, *simple corporeal* Substance, can be the *individual Existence*, *Solidity* or *Mobility* of *another Part*. The only Question therefore again is, whether *Matter* is capable of that *Mode* of Existence, or that particular *Connection*, in which the Property of *Intelligence* or *Thinking* seems to consist.

That the *Original simple Substances* of which *compound Matter* is form'd, are or may be of an *individual* and *inseparable* Nature (for which Reason I am apt to think all *Spirits* or *cognitive* Beings, however they may differ in Extension, are of an *individual, inseparable* Nature) may thus be clearly prov'd, *viz.* It must be granted that God can create the *least* Particle of Matter, or *least* material Body or Substance which is capable of existing: but it is evident from what has been before argued, or rather it is *self-evident* that the least or all material Substance cannot but be *extended*; and therefore there may be *extended material* Substance absolutely incapable of *Division*, or of an absolute *inseparable* Nature. For to suppose it to have a
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separable Existence, when it is the *least* Substance capable of existing, is a direct Contradiction: because a supposition of its being *separable* and existing in a *separate* state, is a supposition of its *not* being the *least* substance, when it is suppos'd to be the *least*. Therefore the *minute, original, simple* Parts of *compound* Matter, or simple, material Substances which are the *least* that are capable of Existing, must be *solid* and as *indivisible* as *Spirit* or *thinking* Substance can be suppos'd to be; and the Properties of them of one uniform Nature: and so, notwithstanding the foregoing Objections, the internal Substance or Substratum of *Matter* is (for ought we know) as capable of *Consciousness* or *Intelligence*, as that of *Spirit* is; and may be the same *specific* Substance. When in the preceding Argument, I say, the *least Particle of Matter*, or the *least material Substance or Body*; this is to be taken only as a Supposition (which cannot with any Reason be disallow'd) that God can exert all the Power that relates to the Production of Beings; (for a Power which cannot be exerted, is no Power at all :) and hence it will appear to be an Absurdity to suppose that there is or can be in Nature a Piece of Matter existing in a *singular, simple, or uncompound* state, which is *less* than that which God can produce. Whence I infer, that tho' in Nature there can be no such thing as the *least* Particle of Matter, since all must have Extension and Parts, there may nevertheless be Matter or Body produc'd
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by God, which is *essentially indivisible*, as being the *least* (tho' extended) which Power can produce, or which can exist in a *singular state*, as an *entire, individual, uncompound* Existent. So that the Substance of unthinking Matter cannot be *always* (perhaps the original, solid Particles of which compound Bodies consist are not at all) *actually divisible*, any more than intelligent Substance is. Notwithstanding I wou'd not affirm that God's Power in the Production of *thinking* Substances (any more than in the Production of *unintelligent* Substance) is by the Nature of the things confin'd to a particular Extension; but it seems to me not to be absurd to suppose that he may *encrease* or *diminish* the Extension of the Existence of any *thinking* Being: and that, if there is any such Thing as a different Species of intelligent created Beings, their different Natures may depend on something that we know nothing of, and not on their having each particular Kind a particular individual Extension *essential* to them. From what is argued, I wou'd farther observe, that if it be possible for Matter to be *intelligent*, the *thinking* Faculty probably cannot depend on any particular *Extension*; but on a particular *Connection* or *Union*, and particular *Impulses*, and *Impressions* altogether unknown to us: and as Body or Matter may be (for ought we know) capable of these, so it will be very hard, if not impossible, to prove that the Property of *individual Consciousness* may not or does not exist in *material* Substance.

It is not a sufficient proof of it, that Matter has Properties which are not individual Properties of the *whole* Substance ; for so hath intelligent Substance likewise. As there may exist and be conceiv'd in the same Body at the same Time, different Figures distinct from that particular *individual* Figure of the *whole*, which is necessarily form'd by the Termination of its extreme Parts ; so the same may exist and be conceiv'd in the Soul likewise ; as being only the necessary Consequence of Finiteness of *Extension* in both : *Motion* also, which may be various and difform in the same Being at the same Time, is no more an individual Property in *intelligent* than in solid unintelligent Substance : and the Motion of a *simple, solid* (or even of a *compound*) Body in a straight Line is but *one individual* Motion of the *whole* Body ; just as it is in the like Motion of Spirit : and *Duration* is as much an *individual* Property of the *whole* Substance of Matter, as either that or *Consciousness* is of the *whole* Substance of Spirit. So that *individual* or *indivisible* Properties of the *whole* Substance, which are common both to Body and Spirit, neither prove *Spiritual* Substance to be absolutely *indivisible*, nor to be *Essentially* different from *Material* Substance. This Point will be farther consider'd presently. In the mean time it is, I think, sufficiently prov'd, that as whatever exists, is *extended* more or less, or exists in more or less space, whether in a *solid* and *resisting*, or in an *un-solid* and *unresisting* manner ; so it is no Con-

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sequence, that whatever is *extended*, must have *Parts actually divisible*. The words *Parts* and *divisible* are us'd ambiguously. When we say a Thing consists of *Parts* and is *divisible*, we mean Parts not of *simple* but of *compound* Substances; we speak of *Things*, not of *one Thing*; of an Union of Substances which are not only *separable* but *actually separated* in Existence for want of Connexion, let the *Extension* be what it will. But *that* hath no Parts in this Way of Speaking, which is *one simple* Substance perfectly *continued* and *connected* without *Vacuity*, let the *Extension* also be more or less, and the Substance *solid* or not. And all such *simple un compounded* Substances, as I take the *original, solid* Particles of Matter to consist of, tho' necessarily *extended*, are probably not *actually divisible* by any external natural Force or finite Power: but whether the Power of God the Creator himself cannot diminish the *Extension* of any simple Substance (material or immaterial) which has not the *least* possible *Extension*, without destroying its Existence, or changing the Essential Properties of it, is a Thing, I presume, above the Reach of our imperfect Knowledge to determine with Certainty, as I observ'd before: only it seems most probable to think that his Power may either add to or diminish at pleasure their Existence without Annihilation of them; there being no assignable Reason to conclude that all simple material or Immaterial Substances shou'd be of the same finite Extent, or the *least* which are capable of Existing.

isting. But yet I believe it is true in Fact, that all *solid* or perfectly *continued* Substances, or the original, minute simple Particles or Constituents of compound Bodies are indivisible by all those *natural* Powers or Forces which are apt to divide and separate the Parts of *compounded, discontinued* Substances.

From what is just now said it will appear that another Argument alledg'd to prove that the *Substance* of Matter and Spirit is not the *same*, has no Weight in it: viz. that *Matter* is of a *mortal* and *corruptible* Nature, and *Spirit* of an *immortal* and *incorruptible* Nature, and therefore, 'tis argued, they cannot be of the *same Nature, Essence* or *Substance*; and that, if they were the *same*, Spirit wou'd be naturally *mortal* or *corruptible*, as we see all Matter is. This Argument is already obviated; and is built on the false supposition that all Matter consists of *naturally separable* Parts, and therefore must be *naturally corruptible*: all Corruption of it being nothing but the Alteration of the Form and Qualities of *compound* Matter, by actual *Separation* or different *Cohæſion* of its Parts, occasion'd by external Force or internal Motion; whereby external Parts flying off from the whole Mass, or the Cohæſion of external or internal Parts being quite broken or alter'd, the Body puts on a new and different Form and has different Qualities from what it had before. This Corruptibility therefore plainly relates only to Matter consider'd as a *Compound* Being, of which the *simple, solid, original* Parts are not

(so far as we know) naturally capable; and therefore Matter in its *simple, uncompound* Nature is as *incorruptible* and *immortal* as Spirit can be with Reason suppos'd to be; nor is more subject to *Separation* or *Dissolution* of its Frame than Spirit is. But there is another sense in which the Soul may be consider'd either as being naturally mortal or immortal, distinct from the Corruptibility or Dissolution of its Substance, viz. as it is consider'd either in a state of Union with Body, or as existing without such Union. For if Union with Matter or Body is necessary to preserve the *Intelligence* and *Agency* (which are the proper Life) of the Soul; this Union being *dissolv'd*, the Soul must be in a state of Mortality and Death, tho' the Substance of it shou'd continue *undissolv'd*. This is a Point which, I think, Philosophy cannot demonstrate one way or other; and shall be consider'd farther hereafter.

An ingenious and learned Author, in a late Book entitled *an Enquiry into the Nature of the humane Soul*, has undertaken to demonstrate the *Immateriality* of intelligent acting Substance, which we call *Soul* or *Spirit*, and the Impossibility of *Matter* or *Body* being intelligent and active, by several Arguments which I shall carefully consider. First, he argues against the possibility of Matter being endued with *active Power*, from the *Solidity* of it, after this manner: * “ *Matter* as a *solid* Substance neces-
“ *farily*

“ easily resists all Change of state ; therefore
 “ it is incapable of being endued with that
 “ Power that could change its state : if it was
 “ capable of being endued with this Power, we
 “ shou’d be oblig’d to deny its Resistance ; and
 “ therefore its Moment, as also its solid Extension.
 “ In short, it is as incapable of being
 “ the Subject in which this Power and Resistance
 “ can at once reside, as of being the Subject
 “ in which Resistance and its contrary can
 “ at once reside. *Matter* therefore is incapable
 “ of all Kind of *Activity*, or of being endued
 “ with any Power, except that one negative
 “ Power of remaining in the state in which it
 “ at present is.”

The Import and Force of this Argument, I think, amounts to this, *viz.* that what is or can be consider’d as *unactive* and *resisting* Motion, cannot by any Faculty or Power infus’d into it, become *active* and *self-motive* ; or be conceiv’d to have in it a Capacity of *Life* and *Activity* ; because Resistance to Motion and Inactivity, and Life, Self-motion and Activity are contrary to each other. To which it may be answer’d, that this Argument proves nothing by proving (as we shall see) too much. For if the *Soul* (let the Substance of it be what it will) is not originally endued with *innate* Ideas, or the Perception of Ideas is not *essential* to it, it must be conceiv’d, before its Perception of *Ideas* by Sensation or Reflection (which is a change of its state caus’d by means of *Matter*) to be an *unactive* Substance, without any innate Power of change.

changing its state ; and endued only with a Capacity of *Life* and *Activity*. This must be its Condition before its Union with Body, or before its Reception of Ideas. So that this ingenious Author must plead for innate Ideas as essential to the Soul, which can never be prov'd, and seems highly improbable to be Fact ; otherwise the Soul without Ideas must be allow'd to be as *dead*, *inert* or *unactive*, as the Body is without *vital Motion* : and so, if it can have in it a Capacity of *Life* and *Activity* directly contrary to its primary state of *Unintelligence* and *Inactivity*, which seems to be common to it with Matter ; it may notwithstanding this Author's Argument be *material*. And farther, since this Capacity of Life and Activity is excited and exerted in the Soul by Means of *Matter*, or by the Impression of Matter upon it ; it may hence seem more probable that it is material than not. Experience assures us that the Soul never thinks without the Help of Matter : in reflecting on its own Ideas, which is an Act of the Soul most of all independent of Body, 'tis evident that it acts or reflects not without the Help of the Body or animal Spirits ; as every one us'd to think intensely must know by the Lassitude and Pain often occasion'd thereby : the denying * this is a plain Error in our Author. Therefore the *Soul* is *chang'd* by the Action or Impression of Matter upon it from a state of *Insensibility* to a state of *Sensibility*, as *Matter* is *chang'd* by the Impulse of Matter from a state of *Rest* to a state

* *Enquiry*, p. 223. in a Note.

state of *Motion*: and as the one has always a Faculty or Capacity of receiving and retaining *Ideas*, so the other has of receiving and retaining *Motion*: but it follows not hence that the Soul is necessarily always percipient or has *Ideas* because capable of having them, any more than that Matter is necessarily always in motion, because it is capable of it. It is true that Matter cannot *move* and *rest* at the same Time or in the same respect; nor can the Soul perceive and not perceive *Ideas*, or act and not act at the same Time. Contrary Powers or Capacities may reside in the one and in the other; as a Power of *moving* and also of *resisting* Motion, or a Power of *rest*; a Power of *Acting* or of not acting; a Power of receiving or not receiving or hindering the Reception of *Ideas*: tho' these contrary Powers cannot be exerted or have Effect at once or in the same respect, in the one or in the other. Where then is the Absurdity of supposing two contrary Powers in the same Subject; the *Positive* Power of *self-motion* or *acting*, and the contrary *negative* Power of *not acting* or *moving*, or of resisting Motion? Supposing indeed these two Powers to be *Positive* and *Equal*, it wou'd be a manifest Absurdity for the same Substance to be endued with them; but if we suppose the self-motive or *active* Power always superior to the Power of *resisting* Motion or Action, both Powers may be compatible and reside in the same Subject: just as we see in Matter two directly contrary Powers continually

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operating ; one in the *Gravitation* of it, another in the *Cohæſion* of its Parts always *reſiſting* and counteracting the *Gravitation*. A Particle of Air, for Example, by one Power constantly gravitates towards the Earth, and by a contrary Power of Repulſion flees from it, and keeps its parts cohæring : and it is the ſame in all Bodies which are not fluid, or are not horizontal. And this ingenious Author himſelf has ſhewn and well explain'd theſe contrary Powers in Matter. † And if it is no Abſurdity for an external Agent (which I admit with this Author to be the cauſe of theſe contrary Powers in Matter) to act thus contrarily at once upon Matter, for good and wiſe Ends ; and Matter is ſuſceptive of or paſſive to two contrary Powers at once ; it can, I think, be no Abſurdity to ſuppoſe contrary Powers to be lodg'd in Matter it ſelf. What Matter is capable of receiving paſſively or from an *external* Mover, it may be capable of receiving from Powers *within* it ſelf. *External* Power impreſſes contrary Affections or Tendencies at once in Matter, why may not *internal* Power in Matter it ſelf do the ſame ? So that there appears not any Abſurdity in ſuppoſing that by the Power and Will of God Matter may move itſelf ; or have a ſelf-motive or acting Power within its Nature capable of overcoming by the Faculty, we call *Will*, or by its *Agency*, the *Effential* Reſiſtence, which as a *ſolid* Subſtance it always makes to Motion, or when in Motion, unto Reſt ; *i. e.* may have an internal Power of changing its own State. And there ſeems

to

to be no Difference in the Case, whether the acting self-motive Power be *in* material Substance, or be so united *to it*, as in Fact it is, that the Body continually acts upon it, and resists the active Power exerted in every corporeal Motion. So that there are in Fact these very two *contrary* Powers, which our Author thinks so great an Absurdity to be together, *united* and continually *counteracting* each other. And I do not perceive the Consequence, that, if Matter was capable of being endued with a Power of changing its state, or of Self-motion, we should be oblig'd to deny its *Resistance*, and *solid Extension*. When Matter is mov'd by an external Force, its Resistance to *Motion* is overcome, and a Power of continuing in a contrary State, *viz.* of Motion, and its Resistance to *Rest* is equal to its Power of continuing in a state of Rest and of resisting Motion: and yet it retains its Moment and solid Extension and Resistance to Motion, as before it mov'd; either with respect to resisting the Motion of other Bodies, or any Encrease or Diminution of its own Motion. So here are two contrary Powers at once in Matter consistent with its solid Extension; the Power of resisting *Motion*, and the Power of moving or resisting *Rest*: it resists a Change of its State to *Rest*, and at the same Time resists *Motion* or a Change of its State to more or less Motion. Its Resistance is to *contrary* States at once, but not in the same Respect; for any Degree of *Motion* is contrary to a State of *Rest*. Just so, supposing the Soul

a solid extended Substance, this living Substance by its *Solidity*, (in which respect it is *passive*) resists the Self-motion or Action of the *Will* upon it; and whilst it is self-mov'd, still retains its property of being at Rest, or resisting Motion; and rests when the *Will* acts not upon it or moves it not: as dead Matter when mov'd by an external Force still retains its resisting Power, and rests when any Force overcomes its Motion, as it moves when any Power overcomes its Resistance to Motion, and its Property to rest. The Consistency of these contrary Powers is, that they are not *equal*; and the internal self-motive Power or Agency, which is a *positive* Property of the Soul, is always superior to its *Negative* Power not to move or act; as external Power is always superior to the *vis inertiae* of Matter, or its Resistance to Motion.

In Truth, abstract from *Life* and *Agency*, every Substance equally has what our Author calls *the Negative Power of remaining in its present State*; so far the *vis inertiae* is common to all Substance as such; and it may be said to resist a Change of its State, because its State cannot be chang'd without some external or internal Power apply'd, which is sufficient to change it. So that if (according to our Author's Arguing) an intrinsic Principle or active Power which can change its State is incompatible with this negative Resistance to a Change of it, no Substance can be capable of *Life* or *Agency*: and solid Extension, if any Thing distinct from this *vis inertiae*, or *negative* resisting

sisting Power to a Change of State, has nothing to do in the Argument.

But Secondly ; supposing a self-motive Power in Matter to be inconsistent with Resistance to Motion, or with its *solid* Extension ; no Absurdity will hence follow, so long as it is not inconsistent with Extension absolutely : the thinking or self-motive Substance may still be the same with that of Matter tho' it be not *solidly extended* ; it may have (for ought we know) Extension without *Solidity*, these being different in Idea, and in no wise inferring each other. Whether it be proper to call Substance *Matter*, which hath no *Solidity*, may perhaps be a Question : but *Solidity*, not being Essential to extended Substance, let us suppose the Substance of Soul to be extended *unresisting* Substance, and consider whether any Absurdity will follow. This Author refers, to shew the Absurdities of this Supposition, to N^o. 22. *Seet*. 1. and N^o. 26. All that is insisted on in these Places is,

1st, That Matter, if *resisting*, cannot have *two contrary Conatus's implanted in it* ; in Proof of which he refers to N^o. 14, 15. This has been already consider'd, and shewn to hold only where the contrary *Conatus's* are equal : and this Author himself has shewn that contrary *Conatus's* not equal may be and are implanted in Matter, or impress'd upon it, in the universal Cases of *Gravitation* and *Cohæson* of all Bodies, especially which are *perpendicular* or not *horizontal* to the Centre of Gravity ; and Air, in every Position of it, constantly tends to the Centre of Gravity

by the Power of Gravitation impress'd upon it, and also constantly flees from it by its Elasticity or repulsive Power.

2dly, Our Author argues; *if it is unresisting Matter it could never move other Matter, unless that other Matter cou'd be mov'd by Nothing at all.* For proof of this he refers to N^o. 21. wherein it is only prov'd that Matter, where no *Life* or *Agency* is in it, moves other Matter and is mov'd by it by their Powers of mutual Resistance and Contact; and we cannot conceive how dead unintelligent or unactive Matter shou'd move other such Matter without them. But if *Contact*, the *vis inertiae* or *solid Resistance* is necessary to move Matter, then that will exclude all *unresisting* Substance, as well as *unresisting* Matter, from being a Mover of Matter; which is both absurd in itself, and also, in contradiction to what this Author intended to prove, infers that the Soul cannot move the Body, or any Part of it, or be mov'd by it, because its Substance is *unresisting* and incapable of *Contact*, and of the Action of the Body upon it. But if Body can act upon the Soul (suppos'd to be unresisting Substance) without Contact or mutual solid Resistance; why may not the Soul (tho' unresisting Substance) act upon the Body without Contact, or mutual solid Resistance? So that if the Author's Argument here proves any Thing, it proves quite too much; and supposes the Substance of the Soul (be it what it will) if *unresisting*, not to be able to act upon or to move
Mat-

Matter, if nothing can act upon it or move it but what is *solid* or *resisting*. By his Argument, the Soul by its self-motive Power may move its own Substance, but cannot move Matter, because unresisting, any more than unresisting Matter can move other Matter. But if, as he supposes, ‡ contrary to his Argument alledg'd here, that *unresisting* Substance can move *resisting* Substance or Matter; why not *material* unresisting Substance as well as *immaterial* unresisting Substance? Put the Faculty call'd *Will* or *Agency* into Substance without *Solidity*, then this *unresisting* Substance [which may be *material*, unless it can be prov'd that *solid Resistance* is essential to Matter, and that the Substance of Matter cannot exist without it] will move Matter just as the Soul does by its substantial Presence and Power of acting: Contact or not Contact, resisting or not resisting having, I think, plainly nothing to do in the Agency or in *moving Matter*. Thus this Author's Argument is answer'd; which indeed entirely depends upon begging the Question, and supposing that Matter cannot act upon or move Matter, if you take from it its solid Resistance, and do not give it self-motive Power or Agency instead of it: but does not prove that without *solid Resistance* it cannot move Matter by an *active* Power, or that it is not capable of an active Power. A self-motive or active Power in an *unresisting* Substance will move Matter, he must || own;
so

so that nothing depends upon the Substance being *resisting* or *unresisting*; but the whole depends on the Possibility or Impossibility of *Material* Substance, whether resisting or not resisting, being by the Power of God invested with *Agency* or *Activity* or a *self-moving Power*. If he cou'd shew that it is of the Essence of Matter as Matter to be *solid* and *resisting*; then he must shew next (to shew that Matter cannot think) that *Solidity* or *Resistance* to *Motion*, is incompatible with *thinking* or *Agency*: which Part of the Argument has been consider'd; and it hath been made appear, I think, that they are not incompatible. But it proves nothing by shewing only that Matter without *Solidity* and *Agency* too cannot *move Matter*; if it can have *Agency* (which is the Point in Question) it can move Matter, tho' its Substance be *unsolid* or *unresisting*, nothing is more evident. Besides, to shew farther the Consistency of *solid Resistance* with *active Power*, it may be observ'd, that *solid Resistance* is not contrary to *Agency*, but to *Motion*, which is not *Agency*, or *vice versa*: So that tho' it may be contrary to a *self-motive Power*, it is not contrary to an *active Power*. We know not that the Soul *moves it-self* in its *Agency*; or is ever mov'd, but by and with the Body, which is mov'd in Concurrence with the *Will* of the Soul, partly by its *Agency* and also by Powers which perhaps we know nothing of. So that for ought which appears yet to the contrary, the Soul may have both *solid Resistance*

stance and Agency, without Self-motion ; or Self-motion and Agency without solid Resistance ; or even Self-motion, Agency and solid Resistance all together.

Another Argument against the *Materiality* of the Soul, from which also this ingenious Author infers the natural *Immortality* of it, is that it hath no *Extension* or *Parts*. If this cou'd be prov'd, it wou'd, I confess, prove it to be *not material* ; but then it wou'd not prove it to be *positively immaterial*, or a positive acting Substance, *not material* ; but it wou'd prove it to have no Being or Existence at all. Existing Substance without Extension is as inconceivable, as Existence without Existence ; *Space* or *Extension* being necessary to the Existence of all real Beings or Substances.

His Argument is this * : “ The Parts of active, perceptive Substance, if it [the Soul] cou'd have any, must be also active and perceptive, from this Consideration, that to suppose it otherwise, is to allow that Activity and Perceptivity may result from the joining together dead inert Parts ; which is the same Contradiction whether we allow it in material or immaterial Substance : for it is to make the Effect perfecter than the Cause, by supposing Perceptivity and Spontaneity both of Motion and Thought, and Reason itself to arise from the mere Addition or Junction of Things dead and inert to other Things equally dead and inert. ” — “ Thus a living

* Enquiry, c. 3. Sect. 9, 10. p. 105, 106.

“ ing Substance made up of dead Parts is a Con-
 “ tradiction ; and a living Substance made up of
 “ living Parts, is not *one* living Substance, but as
 “ *many* distinct living Substances, as there are dis-
 “ tinct living Parts in it. And indeed this *Compo-*
 “ *sition* and *Divisibility* of living Substance must
 “ infer the same Consequences, as if we suppos'd
 “ Matter a thinking living Substance : the same
 “ Multiplicity or rather infinite Variety of
 “ Consciousness and Perception must be as well
 “ in the one Case as in the other. But this is
 “ false, as plainly appears from the *Simplicity*
 “ of our Consciousness and Perception—And
 “ from hence it follows, that Parts and Divi-
 “ sibility are not Affections consistent with
 “ active perceptive Substance, which must be
 “ *one* and *simple* without Composition. *Di-*
 “ *visibility* is such an Affection of Substance as
 “ shews on the one hand, that *Matter*, because
 “ *divisible*, cannot think or be a living Sub-
 “ stance ; and on the other, that spiritual Sub-
 “ stance, because *thinking*, cannot be *divisible*
 “ or have Parts.”

This Argument against the *Extension* and
Materiality of thinking Substance consists of two
 Parts ; one, of a suppos'd Contradiction of dead
 inert Substance being by any means made living
 and active Substance ; the other Part supposes
 that a perceptive Substance having Extension
 and Parts must be *divisible*, and cannot be *one*
 individual simple thinking Substance, but many
 distinct thinking Substances, and consist of as
 many distinct Consciousnesses as of Parts.

To the first Part of the Argument it may be reply'd ; what is *dead, inert* Substance ? It can only mean in the present Argument, Substance not endued with *actual Thought* and *Consciousness*, and an *actual self-moving Power*. I ask therefore what is the Substance of the Soul (in this Author's Sense) before it has any Ideas implanted in it, or before it is join'd to Matter, and receives Impressions from it ? can it exist without Ideas or Conjunction with Matter or not ? If it can exist without Ideas (as he must own it can, unless he holds Ideas *innate* and *essential* to Spiritual Substance) it is then, and till it receives Ideas, what he calls *dead, inert Substance*, with only a *Capacity* of receiving Ideas, and exerting Self-motion concomitant with its Ideas, and occasion'd by them. It is like a *tabula rasa*, not written upon, but capable of receiving Characters. And where's the Contradiction ? It is in a state of Inactivity, but capable of Activity : as a Body at *Rest*, which is capable of *Motion*, cannot move without a Mover ; so neither can the Soul become self-motive or active, till it is acted upon by the Impulse of Matter or some Agent. There may be some particular *Connection*, besides mere Union, in the Parts of thinking Substance, on which its Capacity of thinking and acting depends. Nor is this making the Effect perfecter than the Cause ; because thinking and acting is suppos'd to be the Effect of a Power or Faculty within the Substance itself, but which cannot be exerted without the Union and Impression of Matter, or some external Agent, acting upon it.

Is it not as marvellous that mere dead, inert and unactive Matter shou'd have Power to *excite Ideas* in the Soul, and be the Materials of *Sensation* and *Knowledge*, as that Matter shou'd be so form'd by an Almighty Power, as to be able to *receive Ideas* from material Impressions, and to retain them, and to act and be self-motive by Reflection on them ? so that this Part of the Argument has no Weight in it. And if he had suppos'd the Soul to be originally endued with Ideas (which Notion I hope he will not defend) it wou'd not still appear impossible for *material Substance* to be originally endued with innate Ideas, any more than for *that* or any *other Substance* to be capable of receiving them by means of corporeal Impressions.

Our Author sometimes distinguisheth between *Acting* and *Activity*, *Perception* and *Perceptivity* ; as if he thought the *Activity* and *Perceptivity* only were *essential* and *inseparable* Powers of the Soul ; but then at other times he insists that *thinking* and *acting*, or the *Exercise* of the *Powers* of *Activity* and *Perceptivity* is no less *essential* and *inseparable* ; which is absurd on any Supposition but the Soul being endued Originally with innate Ideas, that Ideas are *essential* to and *inseparable* from the Soul. But in a seeming Opposition to this, he says ; “ * The
 “ humane Soul is indeed at first without *Know-*
 “ *ledge* and without *Experience*, but hath the
 “ *Power* of attaining both.” How can it be
 without *Knowledge* and *Experience*, if *thinking*
 and

and *acting* are, as he says after, *essential* and *inseparable* in it? This is a Contradiction. The Reason then why the Soul is at first *without Knowledge* plainly is, because it is without *Ideas*, which are the materials of *Knowledge*; and therefore because *thinking* and *acting* are not *essential* and *inseparable* in it: And what is the Soul *without Ideas*, without *thinking* and *acting*, but *inert, unactive, senseless* Substance; and why may not such a Substance be *material*? The Power of *Perception* or of *Life* and *Action* is no more *Life* and *Acting*, than the Power of seeing is *seeing*; or than the Power of receiving *Motion* or any particular *Figure*, is really and actually *Motion* or any particular *Figure*. What then is this Power of *Perception* and *Action*, which, if the Soul receives, at least it exerciseth it not, till it is united to Body? and Matter is certainly the *Instrument* of its Exertion, tho' not the *Efficient Cause* of it. The Power undoubtedly is implanted in it by God, and whether *material* Substance is capable of it or not, remains to be prov'd. If we had never experienc'd *Motion*, perhaps we might have thought *Motion* as incompatible to *Matter*, as we think *Perception* and *Action* to be. I suppose that our ingenious Author will not contend for *innate* Ideas of the Soul, or that it is *Essential* to it always to think; tho', as observ'd, he says that thinking is *essential* and *inseparable* in it: and if this cou'd be prov'd, the *Immateriality* of the Soul wou'd be prov'd beyond all Dispute. But on the contrary to this, he explains his own meaning of the

natural *Activity* and *Perceptivity* of the Soul ;
 which, says he, * “ can only properly be meant
 “ a *Power of acting*, and a *Capacity of per-*
 “ *ceiving* ; and by being *active* and *perceptive*
 “ is meant the *Exercise* of these Powers, or *real*
 “ *Action* or *Perception* : ” yet as forgetting what
 he had almost just said, he very inconsistently
 † supposes, that the *Activity* and *Perceptivity*, or
 the *Capacity* of acting and perceiving is the same
 as *real Action* and *Perception* ; at least that the
 letter is as *Essential* to and *inseparable* from the
 Soul, and as *independent* of Matter, as the other.
 For to the Objection, viz. || “ It is allow’d
 “ that the Soul hath *Activity* or *Power* in it-
 “ self, but at the same time cannot *exercise*
 “ this Power or put forth any *Act*, unless
 “ it be united to the Body ; or that the Body
 “ gives it Occasion to act and exert its Power :
 “ and since it cannot act without this Occa-
 “ sion given it, that therefore it depends on
 “ being united to the Matter of the Body, as
 “ a Condition, *sine qua non*, tho’ not as an
 “ *Efficient Cause* in exerting any Act : ” To
 “ this Objection he replies ; † “ first, he says,
 “ it is an express Contradiction that an *active*
 “ Being shou’d depend on a *dead* Substance
 “ for the exerting its *Activity* ; so that it
 “ cannot put forth any Act without it is first
 “ acted upon by that *dead* Substance : all
 “ Action must certainly spring out of its
 “ own Nature.” Is not this pleading for the
 absolute Independency of the Soul upon the
 Body

Body with respect to its receiving by the Action or Impression of Matter upon it any Ideas, which are the Instruments of the Soul's acting: and therefore unless he had meant what is here said only of the Soul in a separate state after its Disunion from the Body, he must mean that Ideas are *Essentially* inherent in the Soul; that it is Originally and by its Nature actually percipient; and that the Union of it with Body does not *promote, advance or forward* the active Power it is endued with, but on the contrary, *limits, restrains or binds* its Activity: so that had our Souls never been united to Bodies, they wou'd, he must conclude, have been more *knowing* and *active* than with them. And that this is his meaning, his immediate following Words declare. †

" It [the Soul's Activity] may indeed depend upon the dead Substance, so far as

" that *limits, restrains or binds* its Activity;

" and this is the Way that dead Matter

" really affects the Soul in their present Union; the Power of the Soul is *limited*

" and *confin'd* to a certain Manner of Action and

" Degree of that Manner; and the Matter of

" the Body is necessary to its acting in this

" confin'd Manner and Degree: but this very

" Consideration shews us that its *native* Power

" wou'd be more *unconfin'd*, if such Impediment

" and Limitation were taken off; and I assert

" that no man can conceive it possible that

" the Soul shou'd depend upon dead Matter for

" *pro-*

“ *promoting, advancing or forwarding* the active
 “ Power it is endued with.”

This reasoning is too important to be admitted without clear Proof of the Truth of it, which is impossible to be had. It looks as if he held a preexistent State of the Soul to the Body; and that by way of Punishment the Soul is confin'd to the Body as to a Jail, wherein its Original preexistent or innate Ideas are limited or hinder'd from being exerted into actual Knowledge and Agency, farther than the Clog of Matter to which it is confin'd will permit it to exert its *Native* Perception and Agency. If this is not his meaning, what he says has no Argument in it against the Objection propos'd by himself to be answer'd: and if it is his meaning, and if the Impression of Matter upon the sensitive Organs does not convey Ideas into the Soul, and thereby *promote, advance and forward* the percipient and active Power with which it is endued, he must (against all Philosophy and Experience) account for our Ideas and Knowledge some other Way independent of Matter; and of which we have not any Idea or Consciousness or Perception. He must shew why we never reflect on Ideas, but such only as were convey'd thro' the Bodily Organs, if the Soul has other Original Ideas independent of the Body, or of any Ideas which were convey'd by dead Matter: and if our Knowledge and Action spring from the Nature of the Soul itself without the Help of Matter, and so far as Matter does not hinder it from springing out,

out, our Author must shew why an Infant whose sensitive bodily Organs are vigorous and no way obstructed, is not as percipient and actually knowing as the wisest Man or greatest Philosopher. If Matter does nothing but *hinder* the Original Faculties from exerting themselves, without furnishing any Materials for *Perception* and *Action*, the Original innate Knowledge of the Soul wou'd shew itself or be exerted at once and in every degree, so far as Matter wou'd permit it ever to be exerted. This is plain; and therefore on the contrary to this Author's reasoning I think, that the Soul is of such a Nature as requires an Union with Matter to furnish it with Ideas, and so to enable it to exert its percipient and active Powers; and never thinks or acts without it. Without these Ideas the Soul cou'd not *perceive*; and without *Perception*, the active Power cou'd not be exerted; and the Soul wou'd have no Ideas (that we know of) if it was not united to Matter, and receiv'd them thro' or by means of its material Organs. And he is quite mistaken in saying that the Soul || "in reflecting upon its own Perceptions even in this state of Union, does not reflect with the help of the Body, as an Instrument to perform such an Action." 'Tis certain the Soul no more *reflects* than it *perceives* without the help of the Animal Spirits and Organs; it may as well speak without a *Tongue*, or move the Body without *Muscles* and

and *Limbs*: And the Act it exerts upon the Body or Spirits in *reflecting*, or *moving* any of the Parts of it, is not *prævious* (as he thinks) but only *concomitant*, as other Impulses and Motions are. So the *Immateriality* of the Soul is not yet prov'd.

Let us now consider the Second Part of our Author's Argument, *viz.* that a perceptive, active Substance having *Extension* or *Parts*, must be *divisible*, and cannot be *one, simple, individual* acting Substance, but *many* distinct Substances; and must consist of as many distinct *Consciousnesses* as of *Parts*. To this it may be reply'd; that the *Simplicity* of Thought and Consciousness is not sufficient to prove the Soul to be *unextended* and *indivisible*, because this at least is as consistent and conceivable with a Connection of *Parts* and *Extension*, as without them. When Matter *impels* Matter, the *Impulse*, *Force*, mutual *Resistance* and *Action*, is but *one simple Impulse*, &c. tho' made by many extended Parts or material Substances mutually impelling, resisting and acting upon others. The *Impulse* of one Body striking another is but *one simple Impulse*, and is so conceiv'd. A single *Vibration* of an *Elastic* Body, or the *Pulse* of an *Artery* of the *Heart*, is but *one simple Vibration* and *Pulse*, tho' many Particles of *extended* Matter concur in the forming it. The *Motion* of a moving Body is but *one simple Motion*; and the *Figure* of a Body is but *one simple Figure* of the *whole* Body: so that *Simplicity* of Properties and Affections is consistent

sistent with *Extension* and *Parts*. Supposing the Soul or thinking Substance to be *one Continuum*, or Connection of Parts without Vacuity, it is reasonable to think that every Sensation and Consciousness shou'd be *one simple Affection*; tho' every Part concurs or is affected in the Sensation or Consciousness: the *Simplicity* of *Thinking* and *Consciousness* may be the Result of the Soul's being instantaneously affected in every Impression from *without*, or Volition from *within*; as when a solid Body impels another, their mutual *Momentum* is the instantaneous Result of *every Part* of each of the Bodies *acting* and *reacting*; and the Momentum of each of the whole Bodies is but *one simple individual Power*. As there may be Connections and Union of Parts that we know nothing of, so *simple individual* Consciousness or Perception may be the Effect or Result of some particular Connection, which makes Substances which are *extended* as much *one*, as if they had *no Extension*, if that was possible. And it is full as wonderful and difficult to conceive that a Multiplicity of solid extended Parts of Matter, by their Impression on the Soul, shou'd excite but *one simple* Sensation or Perception, and not as many as there are Parts of Matter acting, or as different Bodies would do, as that every Sensation or Perception of the Soul consisting of *continued* Parts should be *one* and *simple*. But as the Reason of the one I suppose to be, that the *Medium* of every Sensation or Perception consisting of almost in-

F finitely

finitely small Particles which compose the animal Spirits, and their Impression or Action being uniform and instantaneous, makes their Impulse on the Soul to be *one simple* perceptible Impulse; so in like manner, tho' every Part of the Soul be affected by every material Impulse, the entire Continuation and Connection of the Parts of its Substance, the whole of which is uniformly and instantaneously affected, make the Effect to be *one simple* or *individual* Perception. But according to our Author's reasoning, Matter in order to excite a *simple* Perception in the Soul shou'd be itself *unextended*, as well as the Soul be so, in order to have a *simple* Perception excited in it; there is as much Reason one way as the other.

I know not why this Author shou'd conclude from the Supposition of the *Extension* of thinking Substance, that it must be *compounded* and *divisible* into many distinct thinking Substances: if nothing is *one simple* Substance but what has no Extension, then we can have no Idea of *one simple* Body or material Substance, nor can any such exist, because Matter is mentally divisible *in infinitum* and always extended. But on the contrary, I take all perfectly solid Body to be *one simple* Body; and suppose a solid Body existing, which is the *least* capable of existing, or the *least* which God can create, it must by the Terms be absolutely *one* and *indivisible*, tho' *extended*: and the Connection of the Parts of thinking Substance (tho' material) may be such as that a Divisibility of them,
(which

(which may not be in the power of any finite Agent) may destroy its Nature and thinking Properties.

But it is a strange Notion of *Unity* of Substance, that nothing can be *one simple* Being, but that which is *nothing*. For to have no *Extension* or Existence in *Space*, is to exist *no where*, or *not at all*. *Soul* as well as *Body* hath evidently place of Existence; the *Soul* moves from one place to another as well as the *Body*; nor can any more act in two Parts of *Space* or in two Places at once than the *Body* can: and to be in Place and to change Place denotes *Extension*, of which *Place* is only a partial Idea. Nothing is more self-evident than that thinking Substance acts in *Space*, otherwise it acts not upon *Body*, which is false: if it acts in *Space* or upon *Body* existing in *Space*, it exists in *Space*, and possesses *Space* by its Existence; else he must say it exists and acts *where it is not*, which he knows to be absurd, and has rightly observ'd (P. 29.) "Nothing can act *where it is not*."
 "This is one of the plainest, most unexcepti-
 "onable Principles. To say a Thing *acts* and
 "yet is not *where* it acts, is to say nothing
 "acts there." Thus thinking Substance acts in *Space* or *Extension*; but if itself exists not in *Space* or is not *extended*, it either acts and not acts, or acts where it is not; that is, it acts in *Space* and yet is not in *Space*; is *present* to and with *extended* *Body* and acts upon it, and yet is *present* to no Part of *Body*, because every Part is *extended*, if it is not it self *extended*. All which

are manifest Absurdities and Contradictions. The Conclusion therefore is ; that as the *necessarily-existent* acting Substance of God fills all Space with its Presence, and so can act *every where* ; and does act in the whole Creation by an universal Providence ; and his Sphere of Action is as large as the *infinite Space* itself ; so every created thinking and acting Substance has a Sphere of Action in some Part of Space to which it is present, and in which it exists, and acts only where it is present, not by mere *Virtue* or *Power* without *Substance*, which is absurd [because *Power* cannot be or be *conceiv'd* to be without *Substance*, or where *Substance* is not] but by *Virtue* or *Power* existing in *Substance* or a real Subject, and exerted only where the Substance is, not where it is not.

Our ingenious Author has one Argument more to prove the *Immateriality* of the Soul, which deserves to be consider'd. He thus argues ; † “ Since it hath been shewn that *Mat-*
 “ *ter* is a dead Substance in all respects, it fol-

“ lows that the *immaterial* Substance or the
 “ Soul is the only Thing in us that hath active
 “ Power. And since it hath active Power,
 “ that Power must inhere in it as in its Sub-
 “ ject ; or the Power must belong to the Soul
 “ as a Property of its Nature—and since active
 “ Power must belong to the Soul as a Property
 “ of its Nature, that Property cannot be sepa-
 “ rated from it, *without destroying its Nature*
 “ *altogether* — thus active Power cou'd no
 “ more be separated from the Soul without an
 “ Act

" Act of Omnipotence to destroy its Nature;
 " than *Solidity* or *Inactivity* cou'd be separated
 " from Matter, without an Act of Omnipotence to destroy the Nature of Matter.—
 " This, I say, is absolutely necessary, otherwise
 " we shou'd make Activity and Power a mere
 " *Accident in Nature*, which is prodigiously
 " absurd. "

Ansiv. To make Activity of thinking Substance a mere *Accident*, I grant to be absurd; because it is plainly *permanent*; and is not the Result of any known *Matter* and *Motion*. Its *Nature* also may depend probably on the particular Connection and Frame of its Subject, and may be destroy'd upon a Dissolution or Alteration of that Connection: So the bodily Organs depend on a particular Frame and Connection of their Parts to enable them to act and convey Sensation and Ideas to the Soul, and their Nature and Powers wou'd be destroy'd upon a Dissolution or Alteration of their Frame. The Powers of these material Organs are not mere *Accidents*, but Original Qualities inherent in them; and yet I suppose no body doubts but that the *Substance* of these Organs might and wou'd exist without these Qualities, and that they might be separated from it: so in like manner (for ought we know) the Connection and Frame of the Soul, on which the active Power of it depends, may be dissolv'd or chang'd, and the Power thereby be separated from it, without destroying the *Substance* in which this Power inheres; and that by another Constitution of it the same Substance may be made altogether

passive

passive and unintelligent. If *Active Power* was as *essential* to the Soul, as *Figure, Mobility* and *Extension* are to *finite Matter* [we know not that *Solidity* is equally *essential*] this wou'd be a sufficient Demonstration of the *Immateriality* of the Soul ; because we see that all Matter has not this Activity, if any at all, in its present State and Mode of Existence, is capable of it ; of which we know nothing likewise : but if it was an *essential* Property, it must belong, if to Matter at all, to all Matter equally and universally, as the other *essential* Properties do. But there does not appear to me the same immediate and necessary Connection between the *Power of Acting* and the *Existence* of the *Substance* in which this Power inheres ; as there does between the *Existence* and the *Extension, Mobility, &c.* of *Matter*. And as there may be a Constitution and Connection of *material Substance* that we know nothing of, so I think we cannot know, and that this Learned Author has not demonstrated but that the Power of thinking and acting may possibly be the result of some particular Constitution of *Matter*. That nothing like Thought or active Power results from Matter and Motion, that we have Experience of, is no wonder ; because we may as soon by Matter and Motion form a *thinking Substance*, as any one of the *material Organs* of Sensation : so no Argument can be drawn from our Knowledge of the Powers of *Matter*, to conclude certainly thereby that it *is* or *is not* capable of Thought and active Power.

All the Consequences which our Author has deduc'd from his Notion of thinking Substance, as strongly follow from the *Materiality* and *Extension*, as from the *Immateriality* and *Inextension* of it : Matter in its own Nature or by the *Will* of God being as capable of *Incorruption* and *Immortality*, as any other created Substance can be suppos'd to be. And since the *Scripture-Revelation* so much magnifies the Power of Matter, as to amplify the future Reward of virtuous and good Men with the Promise of giving them a *glorious* and *incorruptible* Body, form'd in the Likeness of our Saviour's *heavenly* Body ; we ought in Reason to conclude that *Matter* is not of a contemptible Nature, but is capable of being a fit Companion for the Soul, and of promoting its Happiness in a State of the greatest Perfection which the Soul is capable of.

Our ingenious Author labours hard to answer this Argument in behalf of the Excellency and great *Perfection* of Matter : He owns that it may be so *refin'd*, as to be a *less Impediment* to the Soul than it is in the present state ; but still, he thinks, it is but *dead, inert* Matter : and if, as he insists, it cannot *help* the Soul in any of its Perceptions and Operations, but even when *refin'd*, is an *Impediment* to it, *limits* and *confines* it ; and that the Soul is more *unlimited* and *active* without it ; no Account can be given, why the Soul after Death or in the future state shou'd be *reunited* to a Body, and that very Body of *dead inert Matter* be join'd to it as a
Reward

Reward given to it, and for the Consummation of the Soul's Felicity: Since, according to this Author's Notion of the Soul and of Matter, the Soul was in a more perfect state before this Reunion with Body, the bringing it out of a *better* state to reward it with a *worse* is strangely absurd to be suppos'd. This Consideration therefore makes it more than probable (and it is most agreeable to Philosophy and reveal'd Religion to think) that the Soul is in an *imperfect* state without Body; and can no more exercise its Faculties of Perception and acting without it, than an Artist can exert his Skill without Instruments; and the better and more perfect the Instruments are, the better and more perfect is his Work. This is the most rational Notion of the Soul's Condition both here and hereafter.

I shall make no Apology for the foregoing Remarks on the excellent Book of our ingenious Author; because I am perswaded, that as a Philosopher and Lover of Truth he will not be displeas'd with them: nor do they at all derogate from the Force of the main Design of his Work, which is to confute *Atheism* by a Demonstration of the *universal* Providence of an Omnipotent and All-wise Agent distinct from, and independent of *Matter*, and who is the *Creator, Preserver* and *Director* of it. This Argument he hath handled with great Judgment and Learning; and has so demonstratively confuted the Scheme of *Atheism*, that his Book

is

is highly worthy the serious and careful perusal of all Lovers of Truth and Religion.

Having consider'd carefully and impartially the Nature of *Matter* and *Spirit* (so far as we know of them from their Properties) and the principal Arguments which have been alledg'd for the *Immateriality* of the Soul, and to prove that the Substance of Matter cannot be the same with the Substance of Spirit, or be capable of Thought and active Power, and shewn that these Arguments are not *demonstrative*; I think I may from what hath been argued on both sides of the Question build the following Conclusions on very good Reason.

First, If the *Substratum* or internal Substance of *Matter* and *Spirit* be the same, then the Property of *Intelligence* or *Agency* belongs only to *simple* Matter, divested of all *Composition* of *separated* and naturally *separable* Parts, and perhaps of the Property of *Solidity* or *Resistance*: and Secondly; the *simple* material Substance invested with this *thinking, acting* Property, never by any Power of *Gravitation, Attraction* or *Cohæsion*, or any other Way of Union, becomes *compounded*, as *unintelligent, passive* Matter is; but that, as the latter is always an *Heap* or *Mass* of Substances disunited and without entire solid Connection, so the former always continues *simple* and *uncompounded*: and very probably (tho' we cannot be absolutely certain) there never was or is an Aggregate of *Persons* or *intelligent Agents*; or more Persons than *one* existing in *Substantial Union*; as we observe daily many

distinct Substances to be united and mix'd in *compound Matter*. So that I am apt to think it true in Fact, that, whether Matter and Spirit have the same specific internal Substratum or not; *active, intelligent Substance* is always *simple* and *uncompounded*, and not acted on by the Powers of *Gravitation* and *Cohæſion*; and *passive, unintelligent Substance* is always *compounded* by the Powers of *Gravitation* and *Cohæſion*; and that, as there is no such Thing as a perfectly *solid, simple material Substance* or Body existing separately by itself, without *Cohæſion* with others; so there is no such Thing as an *intelligent Substance* existing in a *compound State*, or in *Substantial Union* and *Cohæſion* with others. And this Consideration, that *unintelligent* and *unactive Substance*, which we call *Matter*, always (so far as we know) exists in a *compound State*, invested with *Solidity*, and subjected to *Gravitation* and *Cohæſion* by which it becomes also *mutable*; and that *intelligent, active Substance*, which we call *Spirit*, always (so far as we know) exists in a *simple, uncompounded State*, and not subjected to *Gravitation* and *Cohæſion*, whereby it continues *uniform* and *invariable*: This Consideration, I say, seems to me as good a Reason as can be given to conclude that *Matter* and *Spirit* are *essentially* different; and have different *Substratas* or *internal Substances*; it being not probable that the *same Specific Substance* shou'd be invested with such different Powers, and have contrary *Modes* of Existence, and not be subject to the same *natural Laws*. But 3dly,
sup-

supposing the internal Substance or Substratum of what we call Matter and Spirit to be the *same*, it is not necessary that *intelligent* Substance or Spirit shou'd be invested with the Property of *Solidity* or *Resistance*, either to *act* upon other intelligent Substance or Spirit, or upon *unintelligent Substance* or *Matter*, or to be *acted upon* by them : and it is highly probable, if not certain, that, tho' *Matter* acts upon *Matter* (so far as it really acts) by its *solid Resistance*, or by mutual *impulsive Contact* ; yet it *acts* upon, and is *acted upon* by the *Soul* to which it is united, by some other Power or Property, and not by *Solidity* ; and that, in consequence, tho' nothing can ever *really act* without being *present* where it acts, Spirit may act upon Spirit reciprocally, by being perfectly *present* to each other, without mutual *Contact* or *Solidity* ; and even *Matter* may possibly act upon *Matter* by being *present* without *Contact* (tho' we know nothing of any such Thing in Fact) since we have Reason to think that it acts upon the *Soul*, to which it is united, by being *present* to it without *Contact*. And therefore *Solidity* is not (for ought we know) an *essential* Property, or necessary to the mutual Action, of *Matter*. Hence we may conceive that *Souls* or *Spirits* may have no need of *Material* Vehicles or Bodies in order to act upon each other ; but may act by their own immediate *simple* Presence to each other *without* them, as well as *with* them : and it is in itself as hard to conceive *how* they act upon each other, thro' a material Medium in a state of *Uni-*

on with Body, as without any such Medium and Union. 4thly; It is highly reasonable to believe, that, whether the Substance of *Matter* and human *Spirit* be the *same* or not; every *simple, material, unintelligent* Substance, and every *simple, intelligent* or *spiritual* humane Substance is perfectly *homogeneous*, or of the same *specific* Nature and *essential* Properties: and that as all the different Powers and Virtues of *compound* Matter arise solely from the different *Motion, Figure* and *Cohæſion* of the *simple solid* Parts of which Bodies are form'd; and might (was our Knowledge of them perfect) be entirely accounted for this way; so also that the different Degrees and Kinds of *Intelligence* in Men derive their sole Original from the different Exercises and Acts of their intelligent Part, consider'd with the different Impression which external Objects thro' a different Disposition of the sensitive Organs make upon the Soul. And perhaps the sole Reason why Brutes differ from each other in Degrees and Kinds of Intelligence, as well as from Men both in *Intelligence* and the entire Want of all *moral* Properties, may be the different Constitution of their bodily Organs, or a different Union of the *intelligent* with the *unintelligent* Substance, [whereby the same Impressions cannot be made in all by the *material* on the *spiritual* Part, or reciprocally on each other] consider'd with the different Exercise of the intelligent Faculty. For we observe not only that some Brutes are more intelligent than others of the same Kind, by a longer Use and Exercise of their intelligent Faculty; and by
 Helps

Helps afforded them by Agents of greater Intelligence, *viz.* by Men, for their greater *Use, Service* or *Diverſion* ; as alſo probably by a different Diſpoſition of the Organical Parts : but we obſerve likewise, that thoſe Brutes are moſt intelligent and ſagacious, the Formation of whoſe Brains and ſenſitive Organs is the likeſt to that of Men.

Hence alſo 'tis not improbable, that the different Degrees of our *intelligent* and *moral* Properties in the *future* ſtate from what they are in *this*, may owe their Foundation to that *Change* which our Bodies ſhall then undergo, by which thro' a different Frame and Conſtitution of Bodily Organs and different Union of Soul and Body, different Impreſſions will be made by them reciprocally on each other ; and from thence different Powers and Qualities ariſe : the Soul will be enabled to receive objects of Senſe more clearly and vividly, and to perceive the Reaſons and Relations of Ideas and Things more diſtinctly, perfectly and intuitively ; and to act both upon itſelf and the Body more vigorously : which conſider'd, with the *undisturb'd Exerciſe* of the Faculties of both without *Intermiſſion* upon ſuch Objects as ſhall then be preſented to them, may probably lay all the Foundation and be the whole Cauſe of the Perfection of that ſtate. And this is the more probable, becauſe we are inform'd from *Scripture*, that the *Bodies* of the *Saints* ſhall riſe [like Stars of different Luſtre and Brightneſs] with different Degrees of *Glory*, more or leſs like the *glorious Body* of Chriſt

our Saviour, according to the different Degrees of their *Virtues* upon Earth : And the Foundation of the Encrease of Happiness in the *other World* seems wholly to be laid in the *Addition and Encrease of bodily Perfections*, by which means the Soul will be plac'd in a more perfect state, and capable of greater Improvements of all its Faculties. And perhaps our Saviour's Words (*Job. xiv. 2.*) *in my Father's House are many Mansions*, may have a *literal* Sense, and mean that according to the Degrees of Men's Virtues [who believe in him] here on Earth ; and also of those who liv'd well under the *Law*, and in the state of *natural Religion* [for God is *the God and Father of all*] suitable *Mansions* or Habitations are provided and fitted to the several Degrees of the glorify'd Bodies which they shall receive at the Resurrection : that so all those who shall then be exalted to an equal state of Happiness shall have Bodies of an equally glorious Frame, and cohabit together in the same *Mansion, Region or Climate* [if I may so say] of the *new Jerusalem* or the *Heavenly state*, which is suited to the Frame and Constitution of their Bodies ; all of them enjoying the Presence of Christ *their Head* ; and the Communications and Revelations of the *One God and Father of all, who is all in all*. And farther, if it be true [as the Antients unanimously thought] that all intelligent created Beings were united to *material Vehicles* or Bodies in which they acted ; the different Degrees of their Orders or

Per-

Perfections may have no other Cause than the different Contexture and Union of their Bodies with the intelligent Part, whereby they are dispos'd and enabled to act with different Power and Efficacy, and to receive different Influences and Communications of Knowledge from the Fountain of *divine Revelation*.

These will be thought but *probable Conjectures*; and I do not propose them for *Certainties*; but freely own, that notwithstanding what is said, it may be true, that the *Substance* of *Matter* and *Spirit* is *essentially* different; and that the Faculty or Capacity of *Intelligence* and *Activity* is *essential* to the *Substance* or *Substratum* of *Spirit*; and that the *Nature* or *Substance* of *Matter* is incapable of it. It may be also true, that not only the intelligent Part of *Brutes* differs *essentially* from that of *Men*, but also the intelligent Part of one Brute differs from that of another; and even of some humane Persons from others: and so we may proceed, not without reason, to infer that the different Powers and Perfections of *Spirits* or intelligent Beings in the invisible state may result from their different Natures and Substances; and that there may be a Progression of *Species* of intelligent Beings, from the *lowest* to the *highest* Degree of Intelligence; and that those different Species may by the divine Power and Will be so fram'd either as not to act without *material Vehicles* or Bodies, or to act without them.

But

But whatever is the real Truth and Certainty of these Things, in which our Knowledge is too imperfect to determine, and Religion is no way concern'd; I lay it down for a most undoubted Truth, that the *Substance* of God cannot be of the *same Nature* with *Matter*; nor can possibly be of the *same Species* with any other *Spirit* or *intelligent Substance* whatsoever.

1st; That the *Substance* of God cannot be of the *same Nature* with *Matter* is evident; because *Intelligence* is *Essential* and *Necessarily* existent in the divine Substance: but if *Matter* is at all capable of Intelligence, yet 'tis evident that Intelligence is not *essential* or *necessary* to it; if it was, *all Matter* as such must be not only *intelligent* but *equally* and in every possible Degree of *Perfection*, *intelligent*; because *essentially* and *necessarily* so: which is directly contrary to all the *Sense*, *Reason* and *Experience* of Mankind.

For the same Reason God's Substance cannot be of the same Nature with any other Spirit or intelligent Substance whatsoever; the Intelligence of all *created* or *deriv'd* Beings [and such all Beings besides God necessarily are] being not *essential* or *necessary*, but admitting of Degrees according to the *Will* of Him from whom they are deriv'd.

2^{dly}; The Substance of God cannot be the same with *Matter* because it is *Essentially* and *necessarily infinite* or *immense*; and by Consequence comprehends and exhausts all Substance of its Kind; and therefore [supposing
it

it to be *material*] it must exclude the Existence of all *other Matter* : so that either God is not *material* or else no *Matter* exists but which is *his Substance* : but the *Finiteness, Composition, Mobility* and *Divisibility* of *Matter* (as well as *Passiveness* and Want of *Active Power* and *Intelligence*) shew that *Matter* is not *God's Substance*, which is *necessarily infinite, uncompound- ed, indivisible, immutable* and *immoveable* (as well as *necessarily active* and *intelligent*.)

For this Reason also it cannot be the same with the Substance of any *other Spirit* or *intel- ligent Substance* whatsoever ; for if it was, then that *other spiritual intelligent Substance* besides his must not exist, even whilst it does exist ; and must be his *individual Substance*, even while it is *another*, which is evident Contra- diction : and no *deriv'd Substance* can be *essen- tially* or *necessarily-existent* and *infinite*, that being a direct Contradiction also ; because whatever is *deriv'd* can only be such as the *Power* and *Will* of that Being from whom it is *deriv'd*, makes it to be. 3^{dly} ; Two *necessa- rily-existent* or *underiv'd Substances* [which must as being such be *necessarily-infinite* in Sub- stance and all Perfections] is a direct Contra- diction again ; because *one* infinite by contain- ing and exhausting all the Kind, necessarily ex- cludes the Existence of another infinite *homo- geneous*.

But 4^{thly} ; tho' the Substance of God is ne- cessarily Infinite, and being so, must necessarily be *simple, uncompound- ed* and *ONE* ; and admits

of no possible *compound Union* either with *Matter* or *Spirit*, or any *particular Union* at all with either ; but is *essentially* and *equally* present to all Things, whether of a *spiritual* or *material* Nature, and by its Existence contains all of the *same Nature* ; yet it does not exclude the *Existence* and *Presence* of other Things of *different* Substances, whether *finite* or *infinite* ; whether of a *solid* and *resisting*, or of *unsolid*, *unresisting* Natures. The *Modes* of the *Presence* or *Existence* of *different* Substances being suppos'd to be *different*, they may coexist in the same place, without *coinciding* or being *identif'y'd*. *Solid* or *resisting* Substances (we know) exclude others that are *solid* or *resisting* ; but we know not that they exclude those which are *unresisting* : *Matter* excludes *Matter*, but perhaps not *Spirit* ; and *Spirit* excludes from its *Place* or *Presence* all *Spirit* of the *same Kind*, or which has the same *Mode* of *Existence* and *Presence*, but (possibly) not *Spirit* of *different Kind*. And therefore (for ought we know) *God* and *Matter* and all the Species of *Spirit* may co-exist in the same Place by being *present in different Manners*.

What is now said of the *Possibility* of *Matter* and *Spirit*, and of spiritual Beings *different* in Kind existing in the same Place, which supposes a Penetration of Dimensions, I desire the Reader to take only *pro hypothesis*, and for Conjecture ; for I do not pretend to know whether the *Substance* of any Spiritual Agent (besides *God*) is *solid* and *resisting*, or not *solid* or *unresisting* ;

sisting; and so whether any two Substances (besides God and his Creatures) can be coexistent, or exist in the same Place.

I shall conclude this Dissertation on *Matter* and *Spirit* with observing that it is most reasonable to think [according to the unanimous Opinion of the antient *Christian* as well as *Heathen* Writers] that no Being is purely *immaterial* but *God*; and that it is most suitable to the Nature of all created Agents to be *united* to some Kind of *material* Vehicle or Body, wherein they act and whereby they exert their spiritual Faculties. The Reasons for this Opinion are briefly these following; *viz.*

1st, We find both *before* and under the *Law* of *Moses* frequent Appearances not only of subordinate Angels, but even of the *great Angel*, the *Logos* himself, in *humane Form*: this is an evident *negative* Proof that Vehicles or Bodies are *not unsuitable* to any subordinate Spiritual Beings: and when it is farther consider'd that the *Logos*, who is the first and highest *deriv'd* Agent, not only took a *Body* of *Flesh* and so was made *Man*; but in the same humane Nature and Body is exalted to the most perfect state of Glory and Happiness; and advanc'd to higher Degrees of Knowledge and Power in a humane Body, than any Angel or Spiritual Being is; this shews that the Union of a *material* Body is not only *not unsuitable*, but is perfectly consistent with the Nature of the most perfect *deriv'd* Agent; and capable of adding Encrease of Glory and Happiness to that Being, who, be-

fore he took it, was in the *Form of God, the Image of the invisible God, the First-born, and constituted the Head, of every Creature.* For the raising Christ's *Body* from the dead, and exalting it to the right Hand of God, and of Heavenly Majesty and Power, was the *Reward* of his Sufferings ; and that *Joy*, for the prospect of which *he endur'd the Cross, despising the shame of it :* and therefore the Union of the humane *Body* to the Person of Christ cannot but be thought most suitable to the Dignity and Felicity of the highest heavenly State. And if a *Body* be most suitable to an Agent of so great Dignity and Perfection, it cannot be suppos'd to be less suitable to Beings or Agents of an inferior Nature.

2dly ; In relation to ourselves we find, even in this imperfect state of Union with a *gross, earthly Body*, the Soul to exert in some Persons very great and surprizing Degrees of *Intelligence* ; and we not only cannot conceive *how* we shou'd be able to exert our Spiritual Faculties without the assistance of *Matter* ; but are assur'd from divine Revelation that we shall not enjoy that full and complete state of Happiness which God has prepar'd for them *that love him, without Bodies* ; and that they shall rise in a glorious Condition, to enable us to take possession and render us capable of it : and that in this state of our *glorified Bodies* we shall be *like unto the Angels* ; perhaps in bodily Form as well as in Glory and Happiness : for we cannot conceive any more suitable to the highest Perfection than

an *humane* Form, since Christ himself enthron'd in Heaven is invested with it. And 'tis not improbable that as our Souls have their first state of Existence in *Body*, so they never are destitute of one ; or mere *naked Spirits* ; but at the separation of them from this *Earthly Tabernacle*, they have a *Clothing* or *Body* from *Heaven*, some Vehicle or other wherein to live and act in the *intermediate* state. I cannot say I have interpreted St. *Paul's* meaning in that difficult Place, 2 *Cor.* 5. 2, 4. but I think the Thing itself is not improbable. And it was only the Consideration of such *heavy, gross, sluggish* Bodies as we now have, which made the old *Pythagorean* and *Platonic* Philosophers think they were given us as *Prisons* and *Punishments* to our Souls for Sins committed in a state of pre-existence to them ; and that it was absurd and unsuitable to a state of Happiness to have them rais'd from the dead : for at the same time they thought that all Souls in the state of their pre-existence to the fleshly Body, had *material, aerial, or celestial* Forms or Vehicles to which they were united ; and that they retain'd these Forms after the Death of the *Fleshly Body*, which obscur'd and restrain'd the Vigour and Activity of them : and that even their *Dæmons* and *celestial mediatorial Gods* were all invested with shining, ætherial Bodies : and probably St. *Paul* had an eye to these Opinions, when he describ'd the Bodies of the Saints rising in a *glorious* and *immortal* State.

Hence

Hence we may more clearly understand the *Nature* and *Greatness* of the Punishment pronounc'd by God on the Transgression of our first Parents [and which thro' them equally affects all Mankind, one or two excepted] when he made the Death of the *Body* the Penalty of their Disobedience. This we cannot conceive to have been a *real* Punishment, if the *Soul* in the separate and invisible state cou'd *exist* and *act* as well and live as *happily* without it as with it. If the *Soul* when reconcil'd to God by *Repentance* [which his Goodness always dispos'd him to accept] cou'd exist in as perfect a state without a *Body* as with one; then it is plain that the Threatning and Execution of Death upon the *Body* had no real Terror or Punishment in it. But if our Souls (as we have Reason to believe) are so fram'd, as not to be naturally capable of so much Happiness without the Union of a *Body* to them, as in a state of Union with *Body*; the *Punishment* of Sin by the Dissolution of the *Body* is very apparent; and the Redemption from this Punishment by the *Resurrection* of a *glorious* and *incorruptible* *Body*, instead of a *gross*, *corruptible* one, must be a great Mercy and Reward; and worthy of the *Son of God* himself to come down from Heaven, and to take a *Body prepar'd for him*, both to qualify us for an happy Resurrection, by teaching and engaging us to do the Will of God reveal'd by him to us; and also to give us an example of it by the Resurrection of his own *Body* from the dead to a most glorious and heavenly state.

What

What care God takes of the Souls of the righteous who died in a state of Repentance before the coming of Christ, or since the Terms of Reconcilement were propos'd and a Covenant of Grace thro' Faith in him hath been establish'd with all Mankind who are call'd to this Faith, we cannot certainly tell: but 'tis probable that since *all live unto him*, and *with him*, they have (as I observ'd) *material Vehicles* instead of their Bodies, wherein to *act* and *live*, till the Time for the Redemption of their Bodies from Corruption shall be fulfill'd. And 'tis also probable, that as the *Souls* of the *Righteous* will gain great Advancements of Bliss and Perfection by the Reunion of their Bodies rais'd to a glorious, *incorruptible* state, which without them they cou'd not be naturally capable of; so the *Souls* of the *Wicked* will undergo greater Degrees of Misery and Punishment by the Reunion of their Bodies rais'd to an *inglorious* state, than they otherwise are naturally capable of.

Lastly; The true Reason why the *Supreme, Self-existent* God cannot be *incarnate*, or united to any *Material* Body, is the *Essential Infinity* of his Nature [for which Cause also he is *absolutely invisible*] whereby he is necessarily *present* to all Things *equally*; and the *Essential Activeness* of it, whereby 'tis impossible that *his Person* shou'd ever by any Union with Matter become *acted upon* or *passive*: and it is most reasonable to think that as all created Beings are necessarily *passive* or capable of being *acted upon*, so the Existence of the intelligent

Part

Part of all such Beings united to Matter is determin'd and circumscrib'd by it: and therefore probably no created Agent hath much Extension.

And as God *knows every Thing* and *acts every where*, by being *Essentially* and *Substantially* present to all Things; so all other intelligent Agents know only by the Exercise of their intelligent Part on Objects receiv'd from External Things, to which Objects they are immediately present, or by *Revelation* from God, by what means soever it is made to them; and act in Places where they are not Substantially or Personally present, by the *Ministry* of other Agents who are put in Subordination to them.

Hence, as the *Holy Ghost* acts by the *Will* of God in subordination to Christ in the Affairs of his Church or Spiritual Kingdom; so 'tis probable that Myriads of *Angels* [who are made subject unto Christ and said to *minister to those who shall be Heirs of Salvation*] act in subordination to *Him* for the good Government and Accomplishment of the *Kingdom of Christ*.

F I N I S.

